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PREGNANT DRUG ABUSERS ARE TREATED
LIKE CRIMINALS OR NOT TREATED AT
ALL: A THIRD OPTION PROPOSED
Anne Sullivan Kimbel
INTRODUCTION
For some Americans, and disproportionately for minorities, poverty
is a cold and familiar state.' Poor children suffer the financial
insecurity, crisis, and constant disruption to family life so
understandably consistent in homes where there simply is not enough
money to pay the bills. Tragically, poverty often also limits children's
ability to grow and learn like more fortunate children Eventually,
and often far too early, children in poverty become aware and resigned
to the fact that they are poor, and at risk, and that they are likely to
3stay that way.
Indeed, many poor children never find their way out of their
impoverished world. They often receive substandard education at
their local public schools,4 and the utility of that education is hampered
by the stress of adult concerns at a very young age.5
1. MID-ATLANTIC EouIrY CONSORTIUM, U.S. POPULATION STATISTICS
DISAGGREGATED BY RACE AND GENDER, U.S. POPULATION BELOW POVERTY
LEVEL BY RACE, GENDER, & AGE, at http://www.maec.org/stats.html (Mar. 1995)
(indicating that 44.3% of black females under the age of 18 and 33.7% of black
females of all ages live below the poverty line compared with 12.7% of white
females under 18 and 10.7% of white females of all ages, 12.2% of white males
under 18 and 8% of white males of all ages, 43.3% of black males under 18 and
27.8% of black males of all ages).
2. Deborah L. Cohen, New Study Links Lower I.Q. at Age 5 to Poverty,
EDUCATION WEEK, April 29, 1993, at 12 (describing a study in which a strong link
was found between persistent childhood poverty and unrealized intellectual
potential).
3. See MID-ATLANTIC EQUITY CONSORTIUM, supra note 1.
4. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS , U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SCHOOLS
AND STAFFING SURVEY 1993-94, (1996).
5. See Cohen, supra note 2. The author's review of the data yields the
conclusion that "there is little doubt that child poverty . . . is scarring the
development of our nation's children." Id.
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The poor occasionally find solace in the use of mood-altering
chemicals.6 Just as the stereotypical businessman "winds down" with a
martini or two before dinner, the poor of America sometimes find
mental release from their rough days through self-medication.7 Not
infrequently, the poor person's drug of choice is cocaine,' particularly
in its concentrated, relatively inexpensive, and readily available form,
crack.9
Crack is smoked; the inhaled drug is transferred directly from the
lungs to the bloodstream. 10  This highly efficient route of
administration yields an immediate and intense effect, arguably
making crack the most addictive substance in current use." Scientists
have researched and described a biological basis for the rapid onset of
crack addiction, pinpointing a neurochemical explanation for the
nearly unbearable withdrawal syndrome that virtually removes from
the addict any choice to refrain from drug use,13 even in the face of
severe negative consequences.
In 1989, the Maternal Child Health Unit of the Medical University
of South Carolina (MUSC) noted an increased occurrence of negative
6. Peggy Riccio, Research Shows Impact of Poverty on Substance
Abuse Among Youth, NCADI REPORTER (August 1, 1997) (describing an
overrepresentation of drug abuse in the poor), at http://www.health.org/newsroom/
rep/30.apx (last visited November 26, 2004).
7. Id. ("Poor people often turn to drugs for relief from anxiety and stress.").
8. The Nat'l Clearinghouse for Alcohol & Drug Info., Substances of Abuse -
Brief Profiles, at http://www.health.org/govpubs/rpo926/ (last visited November 26,
2004) (reporting that cocaine is abused because it induces "carefree feeling,
euphoria, relaxation, in control" sensations, but that "high lasts only about 5 to 20
minutes" and "may cause severe 'mood swings' and irritability" and describing
development of tolerance that causes requirement of increasing doses to achieve
desired effect).
9. See id.
10. Sharon Begley, How It All Starts Inside Your Brain, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12,
2001, at 40.
11. Id.
12. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 65 (6th ed. 2000). Cocaine blocks the
reabsorption of neurotransmitters (mood creating chemicals) particularly
dopamine, in the synaptic cleft. This results in a buildup of chemical that induces
very pleasurable sensations. The effect lasts ten to thirty minutes, and the
exhaustion of the neurotransmitter supplies causes subsequent craving. Id.
13. See Begley, supra note 10 (reporting research showing biological basis for
addiction, tolerance, withdrawal, and relapse. MRI and PET scans of the brain
reveal brain activity during highs and lows, illustrating why withdrawal can be
unbearable and demonstrating that changes that addictive drugs cause in the brain
that persist long after use ends).
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health effects on fetuses and newborn babies, which they believed was
caused by maternal ingestion of cocaine.14 MUSC's health care team
noted that the patients who were using cocaine during pregnancy were
also seeking prenatal care and labor and delivery services. 5 The team
did not assume that the women who used drugs while pregnant simply
disregarded the effects of drugs on their fetuses. Instead, the team
recognized the women's maternal concern and responsibility for their
fetuses and provided the women with prenatal care while referring the
women for substance abuse treatment 16 through a policy that included
the notification of law enforcement when a patient's urine tested
positive for cocaine. 7 The policy was described by Solicitor Charles
Condon as "amnesty-based [with] basic requirements, number one
being drug free, . . . and, number two, if you would go to free drug
treatment, not a thing would happen to you."' 8
This Note argues that the MUSC staff recognized the dangerous
activity in which their patients were engaged, and that their subsequent
intervention on behalf of those patients was justified and necessary to
prevent harm. 9 This Note contends, however, that the use of arrest to
coerce compliance with treatment served little purpose in meeting
20either the short term goal of a safe and healthy course of pregnancy
or the long term goal of the mother's release from drug dependence."
This Note contends that cocaine abuse by pregnant women who wish
to carry their fetuses to term merits nonpunitive attention and
intervention by medical staff.
14. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 474, 478 (4th Cir. 1999).
15. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 211 (2001).
16. Id. at 211-12.
17. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474.
18. Id. at 475.
19. See generally TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed. 2001). The authors describe societal obligation to
protect persons against some types and levels of harm and suggests a "short step to
the conclusion that a positive obligation exists to provide benefits such as health
care." Id. at 157-58.
20. For a concise and persuasive prediction of the chilling effect such a policy
could have on the degree to which pregnant women seek prenatal care, see Brief of
Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al., Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936).
21. Begley, supra note 10. The author describes crack cocaine as magnifying
the addictive qualities of snorted cocaine. Treatment is described as requiring the
disruption of an addict's pattern of binges and concerted attention to relapse
prevention. The Court also notes that treatment is often complicated by
underlying social problems.
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Through Ferguson v. City of Charleston 2 the American medical and
legal systems are invited to respond to the effects of poverty and drugs
on some of our most vulnerable citizens, pregnant women and their
unborn children. The case presents an opportunity to acknowledge the
disparity between the life choices available to the poor in America and
those available to the middle and upper classes. Indeed, one Ferguson
amicus brief contended that drug testing threatened the autonomy of
pregnant women; it further observed that this policy would
disproportionately affect poor and minority women, since they are
"more likely to give birth at public institutions and have more contact
with state agencies. 2 3 Accordingly, to view the case as a question of a
woman's right to privacy versus the state's right to search is to abandon
pregnant drug users as mere props in an exercise of constitutional
analysis.
Ferguson beckons society to recognize its obligation to create a
solution that serves the interests of the individual and society, and that
solution should entail neither arrest nor neglect. Instead, Ferguson
invites society's exercise of its parens patriae power, the "state's
inherent sovereignty to safeguard the community's welfare. 2 4 The
parens patriae power permits society, through its legislature, to choose• 25
to protect the interests of minors and incompetents.
The degree of dependence and loss of competence suffered by the
women was manifested in their contradictory behavior: they used
cocaine while pregnant despite the desire to safely carry and birth their
fetuses." Such contradictory behavior indicates a level of dependence
and a lack of control that yields a nearly hopeless prognosis for
recovery without intense and sustained intervention.2 ' The parens
patriae power provides an avenue by which specialized treatment could
be offered as a viable alternative to either incarceration or
abandonment of the women to addiction, all in the name of privacy.
This Note first examines the socioeconomic forces that contribute to
the incidence of drug use during pregnancy. It next considers the issue
of consent, looking at the patient's consent to the search through urine
drug testing as separate from consent regarding the release of medical
information to law enforcement. This Note then explores the health
care rationale for the course of action taken by MUSC. Finally, it
22. 532 U.S 67 (2001).
23. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al., Ferguson
(No. 99-936).
24. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIc HEALTH LAW 27 (2000).
25. See id.
26. See Begley, supra note 10.
27. Id.
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proposes that each state invoke its parens patriae power to devise a
sociomedical policy for effective and constitutional intervention on
behalf of the patients.
I. FERGUSON V. CITY OF CHARLESTON
MUSC developed a policy for intervening in women's illicit drug use
during pregnancy. First, pregnant cocaine users were identified
through urine drug testing28 of women whose clinical evaluation29
revealed the presence of particular predetermined indicia of cocaine
abuse.3° The staff then encouraged those women to seek substance
abuse treatment.31 MUSC consulted with governmental entities who
exercised authority based on statute32 and case law33 to create the
28. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474.
29. It is routine nursing care to assess every obstetrical patient for risk factors
of which the treatment team must be aware to assist the mother with the safe and
healthy pregnancy and delivery. The absence of risk indicators results in the lesser
intensity of assessment. The presence of a risk factor(s), however, elicit(s)
intensified investigation and assessment to create a complete and accurate clinical
picture to allow the treatment team to plan for potentially needed intervention.
See, e.g., SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL COUNTIES REGIONAL PERINATAL SYSTEM,
FUNDAMENTALS OF LABOR, DELIVERY & RECOVERY NURSING, ANTEPARTUM
CARE AND ASSESSMENT 55 (1999).
30. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474, (describing indicia as:
(1) separation of the placenta from the uterine wall;
(2) intrauterine death;
(3) no prenatal care (fewer than five visits);
(4) late prenatal care (beginning after twenty-four weeks);
(5) incomplete prenatal care (fewer than five visits);
(6) preterm labor without obvious cause;
(7) a history of cocaine use;
(8) unexplained birth defects;
(9) intrauterine growth retardation without an obvious cause).
31. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 473 (describing the policy as "intended to encourage
pregnant women whose urine tested positive for cocaine use to obtain substance
abuse counseling") and at 475 (referring to J.A. 2739 finding that the "goal [of the
policy] was not to arrest patients but to facilitate their treatment and protect both
the mother and unborn child").
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (2000). Unlawful conduct towards child has
been interpreted to include abuse and endangerment through the use of crack
cocaine during pregnancy. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778-84 (S.C.
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998) (upholding a criminal child neglect
conviction of a woman who ingested cocaine while pregnant with a viable fetus).
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testing policy and to proffer solutions that supported the state's
interest in the well being of the fetuses. These parties included the
Solicitor of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of South Carolina, the South
Carolina Police Department, the City of Charleston and several social
34
services agencies.
Ten women, most of whom were black35 and all of whom had been
subjected to the drug testing policy, filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina.36 The women claimed
disparate impact in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d, since the majority of those subjected to the state's action (at
the state hospital) were African American women. The court of
appeals found that the women had failed to show the existence of an
equally effective alternative means of accomplishing policy goals that
would impose a less disparate impact on African Americans."
The women also alleged a violation of the right to privacy and abuse
of process. The court found that a privacy right was not violated since
the women's medical records were disseminated to a limited number of
law enforcement personnel.38 The court also found that MUSC
personnel did not have the requisite improper ulterior purpose
39
necessary to establish abuse of process.
The women further asserted the urine drug testing was a violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights because law enforcement was notified
of their positive drug test results.40 Indeed, as a result of the
notification, four of the women were arrested; however, none of the
women were prosecuted.41
33. See State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984) (holding that a viable
fetus was a person for criminal law purposes under South Carolina law) and State
v. Jenkins, 294 S.E.2d 44 (S.C. 1982) (interpreting the statute's noninclusion of
"knowingly" or similar language regarding intent as demonstrating the legislature's
intent that the simple failure to provide care so that the life, health and comfort of
a child is endangered or likely to be endangered is a violation of S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-7-50).
34. Ferguson, 186 F.3d. at 473.
35. Id. at 479 n.9 ("Of the ten Appellants, eight are African-American, one is
of mixed race, and one is Caucasian.").
36. Id. at 469.
37. Id. at 481-82.
3& Id. at 483.
39. Id.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (addressing citizen's right to be free from
unreasonable searches).
41. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 67.
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The district court found the women had consented to the search by
consenting to urine testing.42 The women appealed this judgment,
arguing the evidence supporting the jury's consent finding was
insufficient.43
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment without
reaching the consent issue. The court, instead, reasoned that "the
rising use of cocaine by pregnant women among MUSC's patient base
and the public health problems associated with maternal cocaine use
created a special need beyond normal law enforcement goals."4 The
Special Needs Doctrine is a limited exception to the requirement of
probable cause in which reasonableness is evident from "a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests.,
45
For cases in which a special need is identified from the facts, the
Supreme Court has set out a balancing test weighing governmental
interests against individual privacy interests "to assess the practicality
of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular
context., 46  This balancing test is extremely fact sensitive and is
performed by assessing the facts in light of the surrounding
circumstances with attention to differences of degree.
To justify waiver of the probable cause/warrant requirement,
governmental need must be sufficiently important that the search as it
was performed is justified in light of the surrounding circumstances,
taking into consideration "other factors that show the search to be
relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy. " 47 Next, the
expected effectiveness of the search is scrutinized with focus on "the
degree to which [it] advances public interest., 48 Then, the degree of
intrusion is measured first objectively, by the duration and intensity of
the-seizure and investigation49 and then subjectively, by the amount of
fear and surprise experienced by the searched or detained person.50
42. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 479.
45. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
619 (1989) (allowing exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
for searches made "when special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable").
46. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477-79 (detailing the three-prong test for Special
Needs Doctrine applicability).
47. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,318 (1997).
48. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990).
49. Id. at 451-52.
50. Id. at 452.
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The Fourth Circuit applied the special needs balancing test to the
urine testing policy at MUSC.51 First, it found that the policy advanced
the public interest." It assisted in providing the women with the safe
delivery and birth they sought,53 and it protected the fetus.54 Second, it
found the policy was an effective and economically efficient way to
advance the identified public interest.55 Third, it found the testing
policy to be minimally intrusive.5 ' Thus, the Fourth Circuit established
that the urine drug screens did not violate the Fourth Amendment as
unreasonable searches.57 The women appealed the affirmance of the
58
judgment against them to the United States Supreme Court.
51. Id. For another illustration of special needs balancing test, see Skinner, 489
U.S. at 619.
52. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477 (pointing out that the government was not
required to have a need that was "compelling in the absolute sense").
53. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1996) (requiring
interest "important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other
factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation
of privacy") (emphasis in original).
54. For further support of the government's interest, see Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88-89 (detailing findings of growth and
development, psychological and neurological harm to children from exposure to
cocaine in utero).
55. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 478 (describing "little doubt" that the policy
implemented by MUSC "was an effective way to identify and treat "maternal
cocaine use while conserving the limited resources of a public hospital"). See also
id. at 481 (finding proposed alternative practices would be prohibitively
expensive).
56. Id. at 479 (finding the context in which the urine sampling occurred
minimally intrusive since it was done "in the course of medical treatment to which
Appellants had consented . . . [and] [t]he giving of a urine sample is a normal,
routine and expected part of a medical examination"). See also Yin v. California,
95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that medical examinations routinely
involve the giving of a urine specimen).
57. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452. See also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (describing
matter of degree of intrusion as material in determining reasonableness).
58. The women enjoyed the support of numerous groups, including the
American Civil Liberties Union, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Chicago Abortion Fund, and Americans for Democratic Action, see Brief of Amici
Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al., Ferguson (No. 99-936). Cf George
P. Smith, II, Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of Biotechnology 13 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 93, 94 (1999) (advocating "a full partnership of interest
and action should be sought by law, science, ethics, and medicine if progress is to
be achieved over the succeeding years" and discussing the disabling effect of the
emotionalism that often surrounds important issues).
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In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
9 the Supreme Court considered
the case, presuming that MUSC's policy impinged upon the women's
autonomy in that the urine testing was performed without the women's
consent.6° The Court also presumed that the primary purpose of the
testing was to provide the results to law enforcement,
6 which then
used that information as evidence.
62 The women were susceptible to
• 63of
the threat of arrest and prosecution, and the offense with which each
woman would be charged depended upon 
the stage of her pregnancy.4
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
remanded the case for a determination on consent.
65  Regarding
reversal of the lower court's exclusion of the case from the warrant
requirement, the Court reasoned that the urine drug testing performed
by the hospital did not meet the standard for the Special Needs
Doctrine. The majority found that, because the applicable government
interest was the use of criminal sanctions as deterrence, MUSC's
motives were only a secondary goal and that weighted the balancing
test in favor of the protection of autonomy.
66
As to the issue of consent, the majority of the Court maintained that
because the court of appeals had not discussed the issue, the more
59. 532 U.S. 67.
60. Id. at 76.
61. Id. at 69.
62. Id. at 85-86.
63. Id. at 82-84 (describing the possibility that the threat of law enforcement
may have been intended as the means to a desired end of getting the women in
question into substance abuse treatment but describing the threat of 
law
enforcement means as the direct and primary purpose of MUSC's policy, i.e.,
contending that MUSC's primary purpose was not to help the women take
treatment).
64. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72-73 (detailing precise offenses with which a woman
would be charged:
(1) 27 weeks or less gestation: simple possession;
(2) 28 weeks or more: possession and distribution to a person under the
age of 18 (the fetus);
(3) At delivery: possession, distribution to a person under the age of 18,
and unlawful neglect of a child).
65. Id. at 86.
66. Id. at 85 (holding that MUSC's 'benign motive' "cannot justify a departure
from Fourth Amendment protections, given the pervasive involvement of 
law
enforcement with the development and application of the MUSC policy").
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prudent course for the Supreme Court was to express no view, thus
allowing the court of appeals to examine and resolve it.
67
Justice Kennedy reviewed the Court's abdication on the consent
issue in his concurrence, acknowledging that the Court had "erected a
strange world for deciding the case, 68 by finding it "necessary to take
the unreal step of assuming there was no voluntary consent., 69 He
stated plainly that had consent rather than nonconsent been assumed
for purposes of analysis, "the case might have been quite a different
one."70
Justice Scalia took a strong stance in his dissent.71 He stated clearly
that his assessment of the facts revealed no unconsented search.72 He
reasoned that the women voluntarily provided the urine samples,1 3
thereby obviating the consent requirement. He further asserted that
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not require that the
consensually searched party be informed of potential law enforcement
involvement.74 Scalia contended that, even if the search had been
unconsented, under the circumstances it would have been valid under
the Special Needs Doctrine.75  Applying the special needs balancing
test, Scalia characterized the government's intervention as beneficent
67. Id. at 77 (citing Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001) and National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470 (1999)).
68. Id. at 91.
69. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 91.
70. Id.
71. Scalia's strong stance merits consideration. See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE
LOST ART OF DRAWING THE LINE 35-40 (2001) (citing 'The Abdication of Legal
Authority' for commentary on how striving for neutrality can cause the
inadvertent removal of a critical element of justice; quoting Oxford philosopher
P.S. Atiyah, "Legal principle [has been] rejected as a form of authoritarianism").
72. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 96.
73. Id. at 95 ("Until today, we have never held-or even suggested-that
material which a person voluntarily entrusts to someone else cannot be given by
that person to the police, and used for whatever evidence it may contain.").
74 Id at 96 (citing Respondents Brief, Part II:
Petitioners ... freely and voluntarily ... provided the urine samples
... each of the Petitioners signed a consent to treatment form which
authorized the MUSC medical staff to conduct all necessary tests of
those urine samples - including drug tests... there is no precedent in this
Court's Fourth amendment search and seizure jurisprudence which
imposes any ...requirement that the searching agency inform the
consenting party that the results of the search will be turned over to law
enforcement).
75. Id. at 102-03.
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76and necessary. He described the goal of the drug testing policy as
being intended to facilitate treatment and protect the mother and the
unborn child." On the other hand, he valued the impingement on the
women's Fourth Amendment rights as a less weighty concern, and
indeed found those rights undisturbed."
Scalia considered the illegality of the drug use and its ultimately
negative impact on all of society.7 9 Action meant to curb the use of
illegal substances, particularly by pregnant citizens, can improve the
health status of both the mother and fetus which confers a benefit not
only on them, but also on the citizens whose taxes would be spent to
correct drug-induced problems.
Scalia identified the drug testing program's goal as the creation of an
incentive for the addicted women to take treatment for their addiction.
He described law enforcement as joined with the hospital staff "in that
benign purpose," 80 and punctuated his opinion with a sardonic final
statement: "It would not be unreasonable to conclude that today's
judgment, authorizing the assessment of damages against the county
solicitor and individual doctors and nurses who participated in the
program, proves once again that no good deed goes unpunished.""'
Scalia's recognition of the compelling nature of the women's need
for care only spotlights the real issue in the case; it does nothing to
meet the need for protective action illustrated by this uniquely
vulnerable group of citizens, poor pregnant women. The outcome of
Ferguson leaves the real problem untouched. A rigorously responsive
but patently nonpunitive policy is required to intervene in the
addictive process to protect the patients and their fetuses from the
health risks created by drug use during pregnancy.
Analogous public health situations have presented in the past, and
specialized policies have been adopted to benefit both the individuals
and society at large. For example, in 1986 the Department of Defense
tested all service members for HIV and questioned those who tested
76. Id. at 100-103.
77. Id. at 99 (citing the district court's finding of fact and observing that this
finding is binding on the Court unless clearly erroneous, FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
78. Id. at 92.
79. Shelley L. Beckmann, Ph.D., Address at the 123rd Annual Meeting of the
American Public Health Association (1992) (describing the influence of drug
abuse on crime and citing a 1992 report by the United States Department of
Justice that showed more than half of arrestees who were tested for drugs were
shown to have used drugs recently and that cocaine was the most prevalent drug
found).
80. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 103.
81. Id.
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positive about the manner in which they had contracted the virus. 2 To
protect those who reported homosexual activity or needle sharing from
adverse personnel action,83 a law was passed which specifically restricts
the Department of Defense's use of such information.8
Similar legislative action can and has been tailored to allow rigorous
but nonpunitive intervention on behalf of other special categories of
patients such as those in the instant case. Most recently, judicial and
governmental action has altered the manner in which other chemically
dependent patients are treated and is discussed later in this Note.
II. THE PATIENTS
Often, America's poor find the use of illicit drugs to be a reliable
and affordable, albeit brief,85 release from the troubles and worries that
are their constant companions.86 Notably, African American women
are more likely to be poor than are white American women, or males
of either race.87 The high probability of lifelong poverty that many
young, black women face understandably can engender hopelessness.
That hopelessness is augmented by the higher likelihood that the
African American female will end her education without completing
82. Interview with John V. Sullivan, Dep. Parliamentarian, Office of
Parliamentarian, United States House of Representatives, in Washington, D.C.
(Mar. 4, 2002).
83. Id. Adverse personnel actions included, among other things, court martial,
punishment, involuntary separation, demotion, denial of promotion and an
unfavorable entry in a personnel record. Id.
84. Restriction on Use of Information Obtained During Certain
Epidemiologic-Assessment Interviews, Pub. L. No. 99-661, §705(c) division A, 100
Stat. 3904 (1986).
85. See Nat'l Clearinghouse for Alcohol & Drug Info., supra note 8 (explaining
that cocaine is abused because it induces "carefree feeling, euphoria, relaxation, in
control" sensations, but that "high lasts only about 5 to 20 minutes" and "may
cause severe 'mood swings' and irritability" and describing development of
tolerance that causes requirement of increasing doses to achieve desired effect).
See also id. (explaining that crack is abused because it induces "quick high, power,
euphoria" sensations but that crack is almost instantly addictive, the desirable
effects last only a few minutes, and there are more hospitalizations per year
resulting from crack and cocaine than any other illicit substance).
86. MID-ATLANTIC EQUITY CONSORTIUM, supra note 1.
87. Id. Not only are black females statistically more likely to live in poverty,
but the proportion of black females who will live in poverty is staggering- nearly
half of those under eighteen and more than one-third of all. Id.
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high school, 88 and even if she does finish high school, her college
prospects will often be hampered by SAT scores that are lower than
those of most white women or black or white males.89
Examining these statistics, one can imagine how women for whom
these statistics are predictors might see any attempt at escape as futile,
and may adopt the use of harmful drugs as a viable coping mechanism.
Indeed, Dr. Rand Conger, the Director of the Center for Family
Research in Rural Mental Health at Iowa State University of Science
and Technology, addressed the National Institute on Drug Abuse's
Prevention Research Working Group on the subject of drug use as
escapism. The National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug
Information Reporter describes Conger asserting that, for the poor,
"[ulsing drugs provides a means to escape; dealing can be an
alternative source of income. Often people suffering from economic
hardship feel that they have little to lose if they get involved in
drugs." 9 Once involved, however, they often develop dependencies
and addictions that preclude the capacity to choose whether or not to
continue to use drugs.9
With an informed view of the socioeconomic influences of substance
abuse, one can recognize the inequitable fate of poor women that
produces the disparity between the rates of cocaine use during
pregnancy by African American (4.5%), white (0.4%), and Hispanic
women (0.7%).9' To abandon those women and their fetuses to
poverty and addiction in the name of protecting the right to be left
alone would be a disastrous distortion of the values that generated the
Fourth Amendment to our Constitution.
88. Id. (indicating high school graduation or more education was obtained by
84.7% of black females, compared with 93.1% of white females, 91.7% of white
males, and 86.1% of black males).
89. Id. (indicating average Verbal/Math SAT scores for black females 437/416;
compare with 524/507 for white females; 528/542 for white males; 431/431 for black
males).
90. Riccio, supra note 6.
91. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 12 (describing the addictive
nature of cocaine).
92. Robert Mathias, NIDA Survey Provides First National Data on Drug Use
During Pregnancy, 10 NIDA NOTES WOMEN AND DRUG ABUSE (Jan./Feb. 1995),at
http://www.nida.nih.gov/NIDANotes/NNvollON1/NIDASurvey.html (last visited
November 26, 2004) ("[O]verall, 11.3% of African-American women, 4.4% of
white women, and 4.5% of Hispanic women used illicit drugs while pregnant.
While African Americans had higher rates of drug use, in terms of actual numbers
of users, most women who took drugs while they were pregnant were white.").
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III. WHAT IS CONSENT?
A. Consent to Urine Drug Testing Makes a Search Per Se Reasonable
Patients in American health care settings routinely provide urine
specimens to health care professionals for analysis.
93  On occasion,
those samples are used as legal evidence.94  Nearly always and
necessarily the samples are provided with the patient's unequivocal
and documented consent.9 When the government obtains information
from a citizen through a consented search,96 the government must be
able to prove that the consent was genuine. 1 Furthermore, the quality
of that consent will merit scrutiny if the Constitutional rights of the
individual consenting could be affected. 9
This Note contends that the women consented to urine drug testing.
Even if consent cannot be proven, however, an argument can be made
that the testing was reasonable to protect the public interests in the
health of the mother and fetus. However, the consent to testing given
by the women was applicable only within the confidential health care
setting. It is critical to note that the consent to urine drug testing did
93. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY (Robert Berkow, M.D.
et at. eds., 16th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MERCK MANUAL] (recommending
laboratory testing of various body fluids for diagnostic purposes); Yin v.
California, 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1996) (observing that "in today's world, a
medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would
be unusual").
94. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665
(1989).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1584 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding that evidence obtained by a consent-based search is admissible only if the
government (1) produces clear and positive testimony that the consent was
unequivocal, specific, and freely given, and (2) proves that the consent was given
without duress or coercion, express or implied).
96. United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 988 (1993) (holding, as in Glover,
that for consent-based search "the government must show that there was no duress
or coercion, express or implied, that the consent was unequivocal and specific, and
that it was freely and intelligently given").
97. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 89
(1997). 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR. SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 8:1 at 382 (2d ed.
1991) The ultimate question in any consent search is whether the consent was
voluntary. See also id. §§ 8:12 - 8:30.
98. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (asserting that
virtually without exception, "the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver
has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a
criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial").
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not extend to the dissemination of the results of the urine test to law
enforcement.
B. Nonconsensual Testing
1. When Is a Urine Drug Screen a Search?
There are some occasions when a urine specimen may lawfully and
permissibly be extracted from a patient without his or her consent. 99
Such an event constitutes a search when it is executed by a state
actor '00 or his agent ' with the intention that the patient will be
subjected to subsequent law enforcement investigation) °2
In the instant case, a distinction can be drawn between a medical
staff's compulsory removal of body fluids for testing purposes, and the
staff's acceptance of a voluntarily provided body fluid specimen for
which no physical penetration or contact was required.' 3  The
compulsory removal of fluids is a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment, but voluntary provision is not similarly protected. In
Ferguson, the women provided the urine with the expectation that the
99. See MERCK MANUAL, supra note 93. The manual recommends that
physicians order certain laboratory testing in emergent situations, regardless of
consciousness of patient.
100. United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1990) (analyzing the
expansion of Fourth Amendment beyond its usual application to conduct of law
enforcement and describing the assessment of Fourth Amendment implications of
the actions of non law enforcement). "To determine applicability of Fourth
Amendment, a court must: (1) gauge whether the acting party intended to assist
the government in search or seizure activities which implicates the Fourth
Amendment, or (2) whether that party possessed a motive independent of
government's objectives." Id.
101. United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
the act of airline employee with the sole purpose to support drug enforcement
agent is a government act).
102. Attson, 900 F.2d at 1430-31 (describing that "under proper factual
circumstances" government activity that furthers investigatory or administrative
purposes falls within the scope of the Fourth Amendment). Cf Dimeo v. Griffin,
943 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1991) (indicating that reduced privacy concerns accompany
a urine drug test that is conducted in the course of a medical examination).
103. Michael T. Flannery & Raymond C. O'Brien, Mandatory HIV Testing of
Professional Boxers: An Unconstitutional Effort to Regulate a Sport That Needs to
Be Regulated, 31 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 409, 459 (1998) (discussing personal liberty
and the Fourth Amendment in blood testing for HIV).
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specimen would be tested and the results would be used to foster the
health of themselves and their fetuses9
2. Reasonable Suspicion Doctrine
S • 105
Any governmental search must be reasonable to be constitutional.
This reasonableness constraint normally prevents the government
from conducting searches in the absence of individualized 
suspicion. 106
The United States Supreme Court has held that a court must balance
the "intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests"'0 7 in order to
determine the reasonableness of a search.
In the instant case, MUSC, as a government agent, conducted the
urine drug testing out of concern for the well being of both mother and
fetus.08 While the reasonableness of a search ideally is assured by a
judicial warrant issued upon probable cause,0 9 recognized exceptions
do exist that could apply here. Indeed, under the Special Needs
Doctrine, compelling governmental needs allow a search conducted in
the absence of suspicion or probable cause.11
3. Special Needs Doctrine Exception to Warrant Requirement
Between 1989 and 1997, the United States Supreme Court
considered a series of cases, all of which challenged the
constitutionality of the acquisition and testing of nonconsensually
obtained urine specimens.' In the aggregate, these cases created the
Special Needs Doctrine1 2 which defines a narrow exception to the
104. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 486 (describing how women signed consent forms for
urine testing).
105. Acton, 515 U.S. at 652 (stating that reasonableness is the "ultimate
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search").
106. Chandler v. United States, 520 U.S. 305,305 (1997).
107. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
108. For a discussion of the best interests of children when parental care is in
question, see Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of
Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209 (1994).
109. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
110. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
111. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 305; Acton, 515 U.S. at 646; Skinner, 489 U.S. at
617; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
112. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477-79 (describing three-prong test for Special Need
Doctrine applicability: (1) Governmental need "important enough to justify the
particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be
relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy." (2) Effectiveness of
the search, with focus on "the degree to which [it] advances the public interest."
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Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for cases in which a special
governmental need for intrusion outweighs the individual's privacy. 113
expectations. It is generally well accepted that when a sample or
specimen is extracted from a patient without consent, the scope of the
search of that patient is extended beyond the acquisition of the sample
to the subsequent testing of the sample obtained.'1 4 Therefore, in
Ferguson, both the specimen and its subsequent testing were a part of
the search for Fourth Amendment purposes. The documented results
of the test were then made a part of each patient's record.
In the instant case, the MUSC staff was motivated to test the
women's urine by a legitimate concern for the safe pregnancy and
delivery of the mother and fetus. Viewed from the medical rather than
the law enforcement vantage point, the urine drug testing qualifies for
exception under the Special Needs Doctrine."5 Indeed, one of the
Ferguson appellants has died since the case was filed," 6 illustrating the
seriousness of the health concerns the staff of MUSC sought to
address.
The dissemination of the positive findings to law enforcement,
however, was a separate act, the legitimacy of which turns on whether
law enforcement used the information to punish, or to protect and
assist, the patients."7 It is arguable that law enforcement used the
information to motivate or coerce the women to take treatment for
addiction, but the punitive character of the threat of arrest for failure
to comply is indisputable.
(3) Degree of intrusion, measured objectively by the duration and intensity of the
seizure and investigation, and measured subjectively by the amount of fear and
surprise experienced by the searched or detained person)(footnotes omitted).
113. Id. (identifying the Special Needs Doctrine and showing that, under that
doctrine, the screening of urine obtained by state agents from an involuntary
subject is routinely treated as a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment).
114. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 93 n.1 (dissenting with outcome of case, but agreeing
that, when the provision of the urine specimen is involuntary, the subsequent
testing of the urine can be considered to have been infected by the search that
yielded the specimen).
115. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477-79.
116. Id. at 485.
117. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69 (identifying the issue of consent as material to the
reasonableness of a search that yields evidence of criminal conduct because of the
threat of law enforcement action).
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C. Analysis of Consent
1. The Presumptions
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston118 the stance from which the
Supreme Court considered the facts was critical to the outcome of the
case. The Court presumed first that the women had not consented to
urine drug testing," 9 and second that the primary purpose of the urine
testing was to obtain evidence for law enforcement.
2 The facts of the
case, however, challenge the validity of these presumptions.
Regarding the first presumption of nonconsent, the women
manifested their consent when they signed the authorization for urine
drug testing. 12' They further manifested their consent through conduct
by providing the MUSC staff with the physical specimen required for
the test. 22 The women did not, however, consent to the disclosure of
their medical records to law enforcement.
Regarding the second presumption that the testing was performed to
obtain evidence for law enforcement, a distinction must be noted. The
MUSC staff performed the tests to verify drug use and to engage law
enforcement's coercive power, but it did so to control the women's use
of drugs, not simply to facilitate prosecution 
for prosecution's sake.23
2. The Wrong Done
The women consented to urine testing without knowledge of the~124
potential dissemination of the results to law enforcement. Courts
118. 532 U.S. 67.
119. Id. at 77 (reasoning that, "given the posture in which the case comes to us,
we must assume for purposes of our decision that the tests were performed without
the informed consent of the patients... ").
120. Id. at 69-70 (stating that the case required the determination of whether "a
state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's
criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable search if the
patient has not consented to the procedure").
121. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 486 (describing how, although the women signed
consent forms for urine testing, they were not advised that the results would be
disclosed to law enforcement).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 474 (stating that "the impetus behind the policy came from Nurse
Shirley Brown, a case manager in the obstetrics department at MUSC," and was
motivated by a perceived rise in cocaine use by maternity patients and by the wish
to prevent the negative health consequences of that use in the babies born to those
patients).
124. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77 (describing the hospital's contention that the
presence of indicia of drug abuse justified turning over test results to law
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have found the dissemination of the results of a consensual search to
law enforcement does not offend Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
even when government extracts the consent without identifying
itself.' 25 Therefore, to attack the dissemination of the results of the
urine testing to law enforcement, analysis of the dissemination of the
results must be severed from the analysis of the validity of the search.
Indeed, the women themselves separated the search from the
dissemination and challenged the disclosure of information contained
in their medical records as discriminatory and a violation of their right
to privacy. 26 The women confronted the policy as disproportionately
affecting African Americans because it tested only for cocaine, only at
MUSC, and only in certain departments of MUSC' 27
The appellate court found that MUSC had answered the assertions
of discriminatory policy with a legitimate explanation: MUSC wished
to intervene upon an increase in cocaine use in pregnant women, and
the cost of alternative practices suggested to lessen the discriminatory
impact of the policy would have been "prohibitively expensive.' 28 The
appellate court also noted that there existed "no evidence in the record
to support a conclusion that MUSC could have forced other hospitals
to adopt the policy."'2 9
In assessing the violation of the women's right to privacy, the
appellate court took into account the private nature of the disclosure
and found that the government's interest outweighed the women's
enforcement without the knowledge or consent of the patients). See Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870, 875-877 (1987) (determining that a warrantless
search based on reasonable grounds is justified by the state's special needs even if
evidence gained is used to support a criminal conviction); Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455
(reasoning that arrest for driving under the influence can result from suspicionless
stop at a sobriety checkpoint).
125. Cf. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 305; Acton, 515 U.S. at 646; Skinner, 489 U.S. at
602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656 (creating the Special Needs Doctrine and treating
drug testing of urine that was obtained without consent as a search) with Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that a consent allowing access to
evidence is not vitiated by the failure on the part of a government agent to disclose
his role as informant). See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)
(reasoning that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was judicially fashioned
to deter unlawful police conduct and the derivative use of the results of a search
raises a question not of rights, but of remedies).
126. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 481-82.
127. Id. at 480-81.
128. Id. at 480.
129. Id. at 477-79.
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privacy interests.3 The court reasoned that, although there is no
"general constitutional right to privacy,""' there is a recognized
constitutional "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters 132
when such disclosures involve rights that "are fundamental or implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.' ' 33  The appellate court decided,
however, that the interest of the government outweighed the women's
interest in nondisclosure of their medical records.134 In other words,
the disclosure of the women's urine drug test results passed the test for
constitutionality ' as long as the governmental interest was compellingand appropriate.
3. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court's analysis of the case may be viewed as a
confounding permutation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
Court's decision could carve out an area of nonconsent that turns not
on whether the individual consented to the search, but rather on
whether that individual anticipated the full consequences of the
evidence that consent would reveal. 116 In other words, the Court's
analysis may clarify the scope of consent when evidence can be
extracted from the by-product of a search.
Although case law supports the transfer of the product of a search to
law enforcement, 37 it does not clearly support the transfer of the
results of that product's evaluation and interpretation. As a matter of
130. Id.
131. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 464 (4th Cir. 1998).
132. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
133. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. See Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that when a
constitutional right of privacy attaches to personal information, disclosure does not
violate the Constitution when "the government's interest in disseminating the
information" outweighs "the individual's interest in keeping the information
private").
135. A circuit split exists on the issue of whether medical records can be
protected by the individual's right to privacy. Cf Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp.
Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1137 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating the individual has a constitutional
right to privacy of medical records) with Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th
Cir. 1995) (holding that there exists no constitutionally protected right to privacy
in medical records).
136. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). ("Until today, we have
never held - or even suggested - that material which a person voluntarily entrusts
to someone else cannot be given by that person to the police, and used for
whatever evidence it may contain.").
137. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84.
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fact, in many jurisdictions, an argument could be made that by
providing law enforcement with the test results from the patient's
medical record, the physician-patient privilege is violated."" South
Carolina has chosen not to protect the physician-patient relationship in
this way.1 9 On the contrary, South Carolina has enacted a law making
a woman who ingests cocaine after the twenty-fourth week of
pregnancy guilty of distribution of a controlled substance to a minor,
14
0
so no violation of physician-patient privilege could be argued in
Ferguson.
The Supreme Court's Ferguson decision can be viewed as not only
remanding the issue of consent, but also the issue of drug abuse and its
effect on society to the "laboratory of the states., 141 Clearly, South
Carolina has a mandate to resolve this issue in this particular case, and
it follows that the state's policy must adhere to the findings on remand.
However, the social and health problems identified in Ferguson are not
unique to South Carolina.
The problem of drug abuse, particularly during pregnancy, deserves
attention and redress throughout the United States. Fortunately,
members of the United States House of Representatives are working
to safeguard the health of mothers and babies, and encouraging the
states to work synergistically with the federal government. For
example, in July 2001, the Mothers and Newborns Health Insurance
Act of 2001 was introduced in Congress, which would expand the
availability of coverage of pregnancy-related assistance for targeted
low-income women.142 The bill not only proposed optional coverage
for uninsured pregnant women under a state child health plan,143 but
also would provide automatic assistance to a child born of that
pregnancy for at least the first year of life.1 " With concerted legislative
138. Thomas R. Malia, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statute
Limiting Physician-Patient Privilege in Judicial Proceedings Relating to Child
Abuse or Neglect, 44 A.L.R. 4TH 649 (1986). The physician-patient privilege is
intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a full
disclosure to the physician. Id.
139. See, e.g., Peagler v. At. Coast R.R. Co., 101 S.E.2d 821 (S.C. 1958).
140. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-440 (2002).
141. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (describing the States'
right to experiment in social and economic government, and cautioning that the
Court's "[d]enial of the right ... may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation").
142. H.R. 2610, 107th Cong (2001).
143. Id. § 2.
144. Id. § 3(f).
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and administrative effort, a mechanism could be tailored to afford
women treatment during pregnancy for drug addiction.
IV. THE HEALTH CARE RATIONALE FOR THE URINE DRUG
TESTING POLICY
A. Erroneous Presumptions
In assessing the health care needs of the patients, MUSC's staff did
not assume that the women involved proactively chose to expose their
fetuses to harmful substances in utero. Rather, they viewed the
women's use of harmful drugs during pregnancy not as an exercise of
autonomy but instead as a manifestation of the women's inability to
refrain from ongoing drug use, due to the effects of the drugs
themselves. Accordingly, MUSC's staff's primary purpose for the
testing was not that which was presumed by the Supreme Court; it was
to care for the special needs of drug addicted mothers and their
fetuses.
145
This case, therefore, qualified for narrow application of the Special
Needs Doctrine. The need to assist and protect both mother and fetus
was compelling, especially considering the negative physical and
neurological effects of maternal cocaine use on 
developing fetuses.
1
Drug testing and substance abuse treatment could reasonably be
expected to be effective,147 and testing the urine which would have
148
otherwise have been discarded was minimally intrusive.
145. See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477-78 (describing policy development caused by
"alarming increase" in cocaine-affected pregnancies complications at MUSC and
concluding that "MUSC officials unquestionably possessed a substantial interest in
taking steps to reduce cocaine use by pregnant women."). Cf. Acton, 515 U.S. at
661-662 (concluding that the interest in preventing and deterring drug use by
schoolchildren was important in view of the drug use's negative effects).
146. Ferguson, 532 US at 89-90, citing C. A. Chiriboga et al. Dose Response
Effect Cocaine Exposure on Newborn Neurologic Function, 103 PEDIATRICS 79
(1999) (detailing "higher rates of intrauterine growth retardation, smaller head
circumference, global hypertonia, coarse tremor, and extensor leg posture"), also
citing Robert Arendt et al., Motor Development of Cocaine-exposed Children at Age
Two Years, 103 PEDIATRICS 86 (1999) (noting that exposure to cocaine antenatally
"can also result in developmental problems which persist long after birth").
147. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 478 (describing "little doubt" that the policy
implemented by MUSC "was an effective way to identify and treat maternal
cocaine use while conserving the limited resources of a public hospital").
148. Id. at 479 (finding the context in which the urine sampling occurred
"minimally intrusive" since it was done "in the course of medical treatment to
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The ultimate wrong suffered by the women was not the violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights, which were vindicated by the
Supreme Court. Rather, the women were wronged by the dismissal of
their need from the consciousness of society through the opportunistic
application of the Fourth Amendment.
Although the women walked freely out of the hospital, they walked
straight back into poverty and the drug dependence that caused them
to harm their wanted fetuses, and resumed their hopeless positions in
society. However unhappy the situation to which each woman
returned was now compounded by the profound responsibility of a
newborn who may have had neurological side effects from in utero
drug exposure.141
Such side effects commonly cause the affected baby to be irritable,
tense, and fussy, which in turn predetermines a difficult, demanding
and unrewarding neonatal period that significantly interferes with
maternal child bonding. 50  The care of neurologically-affected
newborns can be extremely difficult and exhausting. In fact, many
state social services agencies recognize this fact and provide respite
care to allow the parents of such children some time to recharge,"'
even when those parents have supportive and available family
members and do not suffer from active drug addiction. Ironically, the
women in Ferguson could access such services only if their infants were
intervened upon and identified as requiring special care through
diagnosis of an abnormality in the infants' neurological development. '
B. Standard Maternal Child Health Care
The staff at MUSC knew that the women were risking their
pregnancies by abusing cocaine. They also had firsthand knowledge of
the impact of that abuse on the fetuses the women were carrying.
Contrary to the contention of the majority of the court in Ferguson,
the absence of documented change in the women's prenatal or
newborn care plans '53 does not equate to a primary focus on law
which Appellants had consented . . .[and] [t]he giving of a urine sample is a
normal, routine and expected part of a medical examination").
149. See Chiriboga et al., supra note 146.
150. Scott J. Turner, Maternal Exposure to Crack Cocaine Produces Stressed
Newborns, at http://wwwfbrown.edu/Adminstration/George-Street-
Journal/ newborns. html (last visited November 26, 2004).
151. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-21-60 (2000).
152. Id. § 44-22-10(9).
153. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73 (describing MUSC's intervention plan for women
whose urine drug test is positive as consisting only to substance abuse treatment
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enforcement. Routine maternal and child health nursing care has long
included an assessment of the medication (legal and illegal) consumed
by the pregnant woman. 5 4 Indeed, substance abuse is considered a
medical problem that creates risk in any pregnancy."'
In a clinical organizational sense, documentation of patients'
treatment plans do not belong in MUSC's urine drug testing policy. In
fact, exclusion of those plans from that document does not equate to
the absence of any such plan as the Court suggests.1 16 On the contrary,
maternal child health units routinely include specific risk assessment
tools in every patient's individual chart. Furthermore, those tools
characteristically include substance use or abuse as a major factor for
high risk prenatal or labor and delivery care."'
The primacy of MUSC's concern for the health of their female
patients was demonstrated by their adherence to medical standards for
documentation rather than those for law enforcement. Further
supporting the inference that MUSC's policy documentation was
adequate, if not excellent is MUSC's 1997 receipt of Accreditation
with Commendation from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations. Accreditation with Commendation is an
honorable recognition that is assigned only to facilities with exemplary
clinical organization, including assessment and treatment planning that
is integrated into its labor and delivery unit's daily operation.
Accepting, for the sake of argument, that the primary purpose of
MUSC's drug testing policy was to assist law enforcement, the
assertion of a Fourth Amendment violation suggests that the women
and making no mention of any change in the prenatal care or special care for the
women's newborns).
154. SALLY B. OLDS ET AL., OBSTETRIC NURSING 288, 374-377 (1980).
155. SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL COUNTIES REGIONAL PERINATAL SYSTEM,
FUNDAMENTALS OF LABOR, DELIVERY & RECOVERY NURSING, ANTEPARTUM
CARE AND ASSESSMENT 55 (1999).
156. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82 (describing MUSC's policy as making no
mention, other than offering substance abuse treatment to the women).
157. SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL COUNTIES REGIONAL PERINATAL SYSTEM,
FUNDAMENTALS OF LABOR, DELIVERY & RECOVERY NURSING, PRETERM LABOR
10, 23, 4 (1999) (describing a history of smoking or illicit drug use as predisposing
factors for puerperal infection).
158. Joint Comm. on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., Summary of Quality
Information, Medical University of South Carolina Medical Center (Nov. 22, 2003),
at http://www.jcaho.org/qualitycheck/directry/Quality
Report.aspx? hcoid=6584 (last visited Nov. 26, 2004).
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exercised a free and healthy choice to expose to harmful substances
the fetuses they intended to carry to term and etier. 159
On the contrary, the women's use of harmful drugs during
pregnancy was not an exercise of autonomy160 but rather a
manifestation of their inability, 161 despite their demonstrated desire to
care well for their fetuses, to refrain from ongoing drug use 162 due to a
dependency on the drugs themselves."' These women were in
desperate need of, and entitled to, the health care and treatment that
society provides to its members who are incompetent or unable to
protect or care for themselves.' 64 In other words, the women were in
dire need of societal concern 65 and should not have been abandoned to
their addictions in the name of protecting the right of others to be left
alone.
159. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 1284. The court describes maternity patients who
were subjected to MUSC's drug testing policy were receiving prenatal treatment,
which implies the goal of fruition and delivery. Id.
160. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 4
(3d ed. 1997) (defining autonomy as the principle that "independent actions and
choices of the individual should not be constrained by others") (emphasis added).
161. Begley, supra note 10. The director of the National Institute on Drug
Abuse says drugs reset "the brain's pleasure circuits ... you can't just tell an
addict, 'Stop,' anymore than you can tell a smoker 'Don't have emphysema.'
Starting may be volitional. Stopping isn't." Id.
162. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 485 (listing three women, one of whom is now
deceased, whose positive urine drug tests resulted in referral to substance abuse
counseling and subsequent return for maternity treatment with repeat positive
drug tests in all three).
163. Nat'l Clearinghouse for Alcohol & Drug Info., supra note 8 (explaining
that crack is abused because it induces the sensations of a "quick high, power,
euphoria") However, crack is almost instantly addictive, the desirable effects last
only a few minutes, and there are more hospitalizations per year resulting from
crack and cocaine than any other elicit substance. Id.
164. FURROW ET AL., supra note 160, at 209 (delineating the principle of
beneficence, which declares that what is best for a person should be accomplished
through both nonmalfeasance and recognition of the positive obligation to do that
which is good).
165. Id. (discussing ethical intrusion into the decisions of others and
recognizing that an individual may not want that which others have determined in
his interest and, in such a case, a conflict between autonomy and beneficence
results; also giving an example of "if we treat the continued life of a healthy person
to be in that person's interest, the values of autonomy and beneficence become
inconsistent when a healthy competent adult decides to take his own life").
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V. SOCIOMEDICALLY RESPONSIVE AND CONSTITUTIONALLY
RESPONSIBLE POLICY
The Supreme Court viewed the goal of the urine testing policy as
primarily punitive; the goal of any new policy must be the treatment of
mother and fetus. 166  Modification of the MUSC policy, and
development of any other policy directed at pregnant drug abusers,
requires consideration of both the constitutionality of the policy and
the degree to which a need for societal intervention exists in those to
whom the policy applies.
A. Constitutionality
In creating protection from intrusive government searches, the
Framers were motivated by a strong desire to safeguard liberty from
the unreasonable acts of law enforcement. 167 The Fourth Amendment
was intended to curb law enforcement's exercise of discretionary
authority by making reasonable suspicion a prerequisite to warrant
issuance. 168 More specifically, the idea that animated the Framers was
the "right to be secure," not the right to evade police.169
In the case of the pregnant drug abuser, law enforcement's suspicion
was raised by the hospital staff's expression of concern which was
supported by laboratory evidence. Such reasonable suspicion resulting
from derivative use of the results of a consented search is not
necessarily protected by the Fourth Amendment. Clearly, however,
the hospital's release of the women's medical information to law
enforcement is not made permissible by Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, and South Carolina could be expected to statutorily
recognize a physician-patient privilege should case law legitimize such
a breach of patient confidentiality that could result in criminal
charges.
170
166. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72 (describing the threat of law enforcement as
"leverage" necessary for the success of the policy in getting women into treatment
and keeping them in treatment).
167. Carol S. Steicker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 820, 837 (1994).
168. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 547,552-557 (1999).
169. Id. at 750.
170. See Malia, supra note 138.
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B. Societal Need
The women used drugs, risking complications and injury to
themselves and their fetuses, despite the desire to have a safe and
healthy birth. They were in need of intervention into their harmful,
illegal activity. The manner in which Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was invoked in Ferguson works generally to protect
hospital patients from law enforcement involvement. But a dire
unintended consequence of this extension of Fourth Amendment
analysis may be that it inhibits societal intervention on behalf of the
socio-economically disadvantaged women whose maladaptive
behaviors society itself fostered-by failing to address their known risk
for drug dependence.
Tragically, Ferguson may have reduced society's options to imposing
criminal sanctions on these women and so on their children, or
affording the women and children no attention at all.
Furthermore, application of the Fourth Amendment in this case
must be scrutinized within the context of American society. The use of
drugs during pregnancy affects not only the user and her fetus 7 but
also those citizens whose taxes fund the provision of medical,
vocational and educational services to those who require them.1 To
champion the right to be absolutely free from governmental
intervention is to champion rights without corresponding
responsibility. It is disingenuous to claim any such right and
simultaneously ignore the attendant obligation to comply with the
tenets of the society that identified and protects these rights. 73 The
women sought health care funded through their state and provided
through the state's agents, the MUSC staff. Those agents identified
and attempted to intervene upon the women's illegal activities,
activities that undermined or negated the care which the women
themselves requested.
C. Judicial and Societal Solutions
The prognosis for recovery from cocaine dependence without
diligent treatment is grim, with half of all addicted patients relapsing
171. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 89 (detailing, in Justice Kennedy's concurrence,
findings of growth and development, psychological and neurological harm to
children from exposure to cocaine in utero).
172. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 46 (1991) (stating "the independent
individualist, helmetless and free on the open road, becomes the most dependent
of individuals in the spinal injury ward").
173. Id. at 40-45.
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into drug use within a year of detoxification. 74 Although specialized
twelve-step cocaine and narcotic programs have been born of the
remarkably successful Alcoholics Anonymous program, it is generally
recognized by members of those groups that initial stabilization and
detoxification from cocaine, and especially crack, requires intervention
that the twelve step programs are not designed to provide.
75 Success
has been noted, however, in patients who have received rigorous and
structured treatment.
Narconon, a substance abuse treatment that utilizes a "purification
program" developed by L. Ron Hubbard,176 boasts a seventy-six
percent success rate in treating addiction and describes this as the
"highest in the nation."' 177 There are, however, barriers to the use of
such a program. Most obviously, the $21,000 treatment cost excludes
most Americans, including the women with whom Ferguson was
concerned.78  Additionally, the Narconon program involves
mandatory participation in program activities designed to instruct and
adjust patients in new methods of communication, ethics, and
integrity.
79
Remarkably, treatment is available to patients whose criminal drug
use has been intervened upon by law enforcement. For example, the
Department of Justice utilizes special drug courts.180 Approximately
140,000 drug dependent offenders have been enrolled in such
programs since 1989 and seventy percent of them are either still
enrolled or have graduated from the program successfully."'
174. Begley, supra note 10.
175. Telephone Interview with Scott S., 14 year Cocaine Anonymous member
(February, 2002).
176. L. Ron Hubbard, A Review of Scientific Literature Supporting the
Detoxification Method ("Purification Program"), compiled by the Foundation for
Advancements in Science and Education (August 1991).
177. Letter from Dena Boman, Intake Counselor, Narconon Arrowhead, to
Anne Kimbel, staff member, Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy (on
file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
178. NARCONON OF OKLAHOMA, INC. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION, DRUG AND
ALCOHOL REHABILITATION (2001).
179. Id.
180. DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT,
DRUG COURTS PROGRAM OFFICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LOOKING AT A DECADE OF DRUG COURTS, at
http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/spa/justice/publications/decadel.htm
(last visited May 10, 2003).
181. Id.
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The benefits of The Department of Justice drug court program
extend beyond addiction treatment: the program requires that
participants obtain a GED, obtain and maintain employment and
remain current on all financial obligations. Moreover, participants are
subject to and comply with random urine drug screens. The program's
success is reflected in the births of over 750 drug-free babies to drug
court participants. The program also touts the successful reunification
of hundreds of families and the realization of education and vocational
training goals for most of its participants. 
82
Similarly, the City of San Diego holds monthly "homeless court" in a
shelter for defendants, many of whom are Vietnam Veterans that have
outstanding warrants for various, sometimes alcohol-related,
infractions of the law.193 San Diego's public defenders negotiate in
advance of the court session with the city prosecutor and defendants
typically are receiving counseling or drug treatment before they appear
in the special court.
Such courts are springing up in the United States to "combine social
work with law by practicing therapeutic jurisprudence . . . some
individuals, such as drug addicts and the mentally ill, need treatment
more than jail time."' Specialization is not new to American courts-
bankruptcy, immigration and military courts are well accepted. In
time, sociolegal specialty courts could become a uniquely viable
mechanism for dealing with sociolegal problems.
CONCLUSION
Justification for intervening upon drug abusers does not necessarily
require a punitive result or judgment against these claimants. The
negative impact visited upon society from illegal drugs is sufficient to
endorse the use of "force in defense against another party who is a
threat, even though he is innocent and deserves no retribution."
'1 85
Indeed, such activity is the function of public health entities, as
Lawrence 0. Gostin states in Public Health Law:
Public health law is the study of the legal powers and duties of
the state to assure the conditions for people to be healthy (e.g.,
to identify, prevent, and ameliorate risks to health in the
population) and the limitations on the power of the state to
182. Id.
183. Wendy N. Davis, Special Problems for Specialty Courts, 89 A.B.A. J. 32
(Feb. 2003).
184. Id. at 34.
185. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, UTOPIA 34 (1974).
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constrain the autonomy, privacy, liberty, propriety, or other
legally protected interests of individuals for the protection or
promotion of community health.""
Thus, it is the province of public health entities to act within the
confines delineated by the members of the public to whom they
answer. In so doing, public health entities must choose productive and
beneficent responses, as in the case of the individual drug user's abuse
of autonomy. Notably, such intervention by public health agency
officials is made all the more legitimate when their instruction is
codified by a democratic process.
The Ferguson Court attempted to derive a template from Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that would allow them to decide the case in
a manner that was consistent with previous case law. Perhaps most
significantly, Justice Scalia pointed out that the case required a social
judgment, and that the Constitution is not the appropriate tool for the
settling of difficult societal questions. Rather, Scalia would have the
Court leave the "vast majority of [such questions] to resolution by
debate and the democratic process - which would produce a decision
by the citizens of Charleston, through their elected representatives, to
forbid or permit the police action at issue here.
1 87  Considered
pragmatically, the ultimate goal of healthy mothers and babies will be
realized only if women remain willing to seek the care they need. A
sound, rigorous, but nonpunitive policy is therefore required.
The groundwork for such a policy has been laid. The State of South
Carolina has manifested its values through legislation requiring various
professionals to report medical conditions indicating a violation of the
law to authorities, 88 as well as through other statutory and judge-made
law.8 9 The pregnant women in Ferguson manifested their desire to
foster the health of their fetuses by seeking prenatal care.
Accordingly, it is in the best interests of the patients and the common
citizen that the state's and its citizens' values be honored as long as it is
done in a manner that respects each citizen's individual rights and
forwards the ultimate goal of the policy. Such a goal will best be
realized through nonpunitive, therapeutic legal intervention.
There is room to speculate that such a change in health care
intervention may be welcomed by the women involved. For example,
186. GOSTIN, supra note 24, at 4.
187. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 92.
188. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (2000).
189. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (1997) (upholding a criminal child
neglect conviction of a woman who ingested cocaine while pregnant with a viable
fetus). See also State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984) (holding that a viable
fetus was a person for criminal law purposes).
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critics of state delivery of health care contend that the emphasis on
each state's autonomy in health service plans results in inadequate care
for ethnic Americans.1 90 The United States' health care system might
benefit from studying the social service programs that intervene upon
particular health problems that have been implemented in Europe and
successfully protect the health and welfare of its citizens.191
A balance must be struck, however, between beneficent oversight
and the respect for patient autonomy. The late Justice William J.
Brennan once wrote,
In The Republic and in The Laws, Plato offered a vision of a
unified society, where the needs of children are met not by
parents but by the government, and where no intermediate
forms of association stand between the individual and the State.
This vision is a brilliant one,but it is not our own.192
Indeed, each state within the United States, with its rich mix of
social, political, religious, and ethnic groups, must strive to discover
and apply necessary basic ethical principles in their investigation and
thoughtful consideration of the benefits and risks of potential course of
action. 93 In so doing, each state is challenged to persist in the effort to
achieve an ultimate and real goal: to support women specifically in
their pursuit of safe and healthy pregnancy by providing every woman
all necessary health care, regardless of her socioeconomic status.
190. See Vernellia R. Randall, Symposium: Does Clinton's Health Care Reform
Proposal Ensure Equality of Health Care for Ethnic Americans and the Poor?, 60
BROOK. L. REV. 167, 180-182 (1994) (criticizing the emphasis on state's autonomy
in health service plans and describing the resulting inadequacy of care provided to
ethnic Americans).
191. GLENDON, supra note 172, at 99 (citing Gerhard Casper, Changing
Concepts of Constitutionalism: 18th to 20th Century, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 311, 328
and David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 864 (1986).
192. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 632 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. See K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS
54 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Leroy Walters eds., 3d ed. 1989).
